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Introduction 
Following the aftermath of 9/11, U.S. policymakers have become concerned with America’s 
image throughout the Muslim world. A large part of that image is affected by the messages 
delivered through media or other means of communication. Some speculation has been made 
that the perception of U.S. policy around the world has contributed to the rise and fall of different 
terrorist organizations. Groups such as al-Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood, Egyptian Islamic 
Jihad and Jema’at Islami have drawn on anti-American rhetoric in order to reinforce their 
members’ commitment to the cause. Many U.S. scholars and policy strategists have reinforced 
the importance of delivering a message that welcomes tolerance and shuns extremism whereby 
creating a more favorable view of the United States throughout the Islamic world.  
One particular terror organization that has come under scrutiny more recently has been the 
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), an Algerian-based Islamist guerrilla group that 
has been fighting to overthrow the Algerian government and institute an Islamic state. Some 
experts have opined that by reaching out to al-Qaeda, the group is attempting to siphon 
resources such as money and membership from bin Laden’s group in order to sustain its growth 
in Algeria. Another important source of potential recruits has been the Maghrebian Diaspora 
throughout Europe.  
Terrorist recruitment has come under intense scrutiny by counter-terrorism experts throughout the 
world. Recruitment is conducted in numerous ways, but for this project we were primarily 
concerned with those that effect a given population in Algeria or among the North African 
immigrant Diaspora in France. Our agent-based model focused on levels of perceived 
government legitimacy and the effect of narratives and counter-narratives on the potential recruit. 
Countering recruitment efforts benefits the counter-terrorist by reducing the pool of potential 
members which can populate the terror group and help to promulgate violence. It may not be a 
silver bullet for ending violent extremism, but is an invaluable tool in the fight against terror.  
Messages can be delivered to a target in a variety of ways: media (television, radio, print, movies), 
personal (familial, friend, or social networks), religious (spiritual advisors/students, prayer groups, 
newsletters or proselytizing), and through education (textbooks, curricula, student/teacher 
relationships). Logic states that if a message can impact or possibly increase membership in an 
organization, anti-messaging (for example, delivering a message counter to that which is being 
communicated) may also impact and decrease membership in an organization. One area of study 
that records the effect of positive or negative messaging on a population has been advertising 
and marketing strategy. American advertisers have been using framing strategies, narratives, 
symbols and behavior-influencing messages throughout the history of marketing and have 
created a public battle space in which companies fight a war of words seeking to credit their own 
product while simultaneously discrediting others. The same psychology of marketing products 
can be applied to terrorist marketing strategies. Both business advertisers and terrorist group 
recruiters seek to gain more individuals who are willing to buy their “product,” and more 
importantly who would be willing to market that product on their behalf. The goal: more customers, 
more committed and motivated buyers of the product which translates for the businessman to 
more capital, and for the terrorist, more “believers” from which to choose from for operations.  
One way terrorist groups recruit members is to provide the opportunity for the person to belong to 
an affinity group who gives the member a sense of common identity and purpose.[1] To entice the 
member to their group they must craft and deliver an effective message. The message must be 
packaged (framed) in a way that will be acceptable to the audience, which will resonate 
significantly with their target population and deliver the results they are looking for. Advertising 
takes money and a savvy message architect. Terror recruitment strategies are no different. In 
order to bring a recruit from sympathetic-uncommitted to dedicated-committed takes a breadth 
and depth of knowledge in message manipulation and persuasive strategies. Advertisers want 
their audience to feel that if they buy their product, they will have immediate gratification. Similarly, 
terrorist recruiters sell the idea that by acting on behalf of their group, members will receive 
immediate satisfaction that something is being done to relieve their frustration. There are many 
parallels between advertising strategy and terrorist recruitment. Terrorism is a business in itself; 
some groups are highly organized, hierarchical, with a stated mission and values. They advertise 
using media and relationships and seek to transmit their message to those willing to buy the 
product they offer, belonging to an organization with higher goals and purposes that they could 
not achieve on their own.  
This project is important because it examines one strategy to counteract terror recruitment efforts 
for the GSPC. To prevent the group from reaching the growth stage, U.S. counter-terror 
organizations will be able to fight a battle within a media or social battle space and without 
resorting to any physical violence. With U.S. troops committed to a war in Iraq, it is even more 
difficult to apply kinetic anti-terror efforts on a large scale. A strong counter-messaging campaign 
can be waged successfully with the results being a significantly smaller pool of potential recruits 
for the GSPC and a blow to the credibility of the organization. The GSPC may be on the decline, 
but that trend can be reversed if they are able to sell their vision to a group of disaffected youth 
that are searching for a path that allows them to reclaim their pride and commit to a cause worthy 
of their time and energy.[2]  
More attention has been paid to the European Muslim immigrant population after a series of riots 
were conducted in and around Paris. The protests occurred after two Muslim boys were 
electrocuted attempting to outrun police who were investigating a break in. The North African 
communities near Seine Saint Denis and Hauts-de-Seine became scenes of desperation after 
violence erupted and cars were burned resulting in the arrest of 258 people.[3] Terror recruiters 
have an advantage within the Diaspora. The GSPC has a cultural bye when it comes to the 
immigrant population. The different pockets of Maghrebian immigrants have formed identity 
“hubs” where those North African immigrants that feel displaced can congregate and feel 
welcomed and more “at home.” Between the GSPC and al-Qaeda is the danger of diffusion or the 
movement of ideas, practices and frames from one country to another, in this case, from North 
Africa to Europe. Another danger in the groups’ alliance is the possibility of transnational 
collective action, “a coordinated international campaign against international actors, other states 
or international institutions.”[4] If GSPC and al-Qaeda become partners in more than name-only, 
GSPC will be able to expand their field of vision for recruits and help to produce transnational 
identities.[5]  
There are four primary questions we sought answers to with this project. First, using social 
mobilization theory, specifically framing strategies and narrative exploitation, we explore trends of 
message resonance among potential GSPC recruits in Algeria and among the Maghrebian 
Diaspora in France. We wanted to find out what reaction (positive, negative or neutral) the 
message receivers had after being subjected to the GSPC’s recruitment efforts. We observed 
how long it will take for the message to be effective (effective being defined as joining rates for 
GSPC) and to discover if there is a point at which the message creates a saturation effect and 
repels potential recruits. In a similar vein, we investigated counter-narrative (anti-messaging) 
strategies and their impact on preventing potential recruits from joining the group. Finally, we 
questioned whether using effective advertising and marketing strategies would affect the 
recruitment rate of the group.  
This paper is organized into five parts. First, we present social mobilization theory (framing 
strategies in particular), the psychology of advertising and marketing and terrorist recruitment. 
Second, we explore the GSPC organization in particular and discuss the recruitment strategies 
and targeting analysis used by the group in order to acquire committed joiners. Third, we present 
and explore our agent based model creating a pseudo-environment that applies inputs 
representing messages and anti-messages on an artificial population programmed with certain 
levels of receptivity based on perceptions of legitimacy for the given government (Algeria and 
France respectively) and the impact of messaging by GSPC recruiters and anti-messaging by the 
two governments. Next we discuss the results of the model and present a carefully constructed 
argument from the outcome that will contain recommendations for future policies and strategies in 
countering recruitment efforts by the group. These recommendations may be applicable to other 
anti-terrorism efforts for different terror groups around the world. Finally, we make other research 
recommendations and conclude our paper.  
Part I: Framing, Narratives, Symbols and Advertising Strategy 
In order to explore the question of framing strategies employed by the GSPC, it is important to 
review the concept of framing using symbols, emotions and narratives, and explore the 
implications on the success or failure of a terrorist group’s recruitment methods. Framing is a vital 
component of the recruiting equation. It allows for the recruiter to use culturally familiar words, 
symbols or narratives (stories) targeting the potential recruit which resonates and incites an 
emotional reaction that subsequently opens the door for a future relationship based on common 
opinions, ideologies and eventually trust. Frames, similar to metaphors delineate different ways of 
thinking about political issues.[6] Social movement scholars David Snow and Robert Benford 
define a frame as, “an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ 
by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences 
of actions within one’s present or past environment.”[7] The two scholars cite three types of 
framing as necessary for successful recruitment: diagnostic, prognostic and motivational. 
Diagnostic framing aims to persuade potential recruits that a problem exists and need to be 
addressed, prognostic framing presents strategies, tactics and targets and motivational framing 
convinces them to take action.[8]  
Framing can include narratives (stories, myths), symbols (religious, political, personal) or slogans 
(bumper stickers, jingles, songs). The narratives used in framing are very important to examine. 
“Narrative fidelity” has been a concept applied to cultural resonation of the stories, myths, folk 
tales that are part of the sender or receiver’s heritage and serve to create a lens through which 
current events and activities can create meaning in the present.[9] Frames serve to prove or 
refute claims made by the opposition and can be manipulated to distort messages and stir 
emotion. Framing allows the bridging between individuals who construct meaning and socio-
cultural process that present meaning that are often contested.[10] Framing becomes a 
connection between cognition and culture.[11]  
For our research project, it is fundamentally important to understand the narratives that buttress 
the salafi cause and which are transmitted to each potential foot soldier and member of the 
organization. The problem is not in the transmission of the message per se, but in the acceptance 
and identification with that message by the recipient. The authors suggest that by understanding 
the stories the terrorists tell, countering the terrorist group’s genesis, growth, maturation and 
transformation will become easier to undermine and eventually disrupt or defeat them.[12] 
Weaving together myths and incorporating them into the recruitment strategy of GSPC will allow 
for a wider reach and greater probability for success in order to secure membership for their 
organization.  
Why Frame?  
The purpose of framing is ultimately to foster and grow support for a cause or movement. In the 
case of the GSPC, or other salafi group, framing is a strategy used to entice new members into 
the group and to keep them there. The concept of strategic framing of grievances is linked hand 
in glove with susceptibility to movement participation and even more intimately with efforts to 
keep participants committed during the group’s growth, maturation and eventual 
transformation.[13] Social movement scholar Jorge Cadena-Roa opines that framing concepts 
allow us to empirically examine the process through which a given objective situation is defined 
and experienced.[14]  
The other half to the framing strategy is the level of resonance that the frame has with its 
audience. Cultural resonance is defined as, “understanding how a movement frame is shaped by 
and in turn shapes the cultural environment.”[15] A perfectly good frame can be completely 
useless if it has no effect on the audience. Therefore, resonance is extremely important in framing 
strategies. Snow and Benford presented three conditions for frame resonance: empirical 
credibility, experiential commensurability and narrative fidelity, in other words, “the fit between the 
frames and previous beliefs, life experiences, or cultural narratives.”[16] If the researcher 
understands what resonates and what does not, they can understand how message receivers 
process movement frames (and anticipate reactions to frame alignments). This fact also applies 
to the use of symbols, emotions and narratives. Symbols provide meaning to an interaction with 
different actors. The recruiter must ensure that his message is received by his target audience 
and that positive action results (membership in the organization rises). If one frame is not 
successful, a movement may undergo what is termed a “frame alignment process.” These 
processes allow movement activists to produce and shape the motivations and rationale for 
mobilization and to adjust the frames to counter those offered by an opposition.[17] A narrative, 
story or myth has a cultural resonance that carries familiarity and some sense of shared meaning 
and value.  
Charles Tilly, a renowned social movement theorist, opined that social movements choose certain 
strategies and tactics based on a “repertoire” of collective action.[18] Repertoire is the broad 
cultural interpretation of when and why people choose certain methods of resistance (protest, 
violence, picketing etc). It is the, “’toolkit’ of habits, skills, and styles from which people construct 
‘strategies of action.’”[19] The repertoire can constrain certain actions of a group, but it can also 
contain ideological and cultural expressions including rhetorics and symbols.[20] The right 
repertoire can create a sense of legitimacy for the movement and allow for limited participation in 
politics. The meanings and interpretations for certain symbols or cue words can change over time. 
What resonated twenty, thirty or even fifty years ago may not resonate today.  
The concept of “culture” is contested among social scientists. For this project, we will refer to the 
definition of culture provided by Ann Swidler of Stanford University, “…culture consists of such 
symbolic vehicles of meaning, including beliefs, ritual practices, art forms and ceremonies, as well 
as informal cultural practices such as language, gossip, stories and rituals of daily life.”[21] 
Conglomerations of culture can mesh with themes of collective identity, an individual’s “cognitive, 
moral and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice or institution. It is a 
perception of a shared status or relation which may be imagined rather than experienced 
directly.”[22] Collective identities are expressed in cultural mores such as narratives, symbols, 
rituals, clothing and speaking styles and reflect positive feelings among members of the group.[23] 
If we apply this to the situation in Algeria, a dominant secular government has limited political 
access to Islamist groups such as the GSPC which has created an alternative collective identity 
that has become opposition to the current government in power. Islamic identity is transcribed to 
most members of the GSPC as a commitment to stricter tenets of the faith, particular Islamic 
dress and a more streamlined identity as one of the “faithful.” Similarly, in France, a large portion 
of the Maghrebian immigrant Diaspora has been treated as an “other” (with respect to the 
indigenous French population) so has strengthened its collective identity in order to face the 
discrimination and repression of the French government. Political hot-button issues such as the 
French public school banning of the hijab, an optional head covering worn by Muslim women 
have become powerful rhetoric and narratives among the Islamist groups in Europe and abroad. 
Certain Islamist groups have seen this as a threat to their unalienable religious rights and have 
crafted innovative messaging strategies to present the issue as an affront to Muslims everywhere. 
In this case, the debate over the hijab has ceased becoming one over an individual female’s right 
to choose modesty into a global battle over religious expression. Circles of collective identity have 
expanded even further into the political and social spheres and have created fodder for terror 
organizations to justify targeting French or European political institutions. It is important to 
understand issues of collective identity as they relate to frames because some frames overlap 
and spill into collective identities that may be larger than a local group or gender.  
Symbols  
Symbols provide another useful tool in the framing toolkit. Symbols represent something that has 
broader meaning. The use of a symbol requires familiarity with the target culture in order to gain 
maximum output from its use. Terror groups will often fashion flags, patches or other identification 
badges which contain symbols. Some have religious meaning, others a more war-like schema 
and some a slogan or motto. Each symbol has a particular meaning to the group and provides a 
label for which the group’s identity can perpetuate group solidarity.[24] As humans grow, they 
form complex concepts out of their experiences which are carried as patterns of ideas and 
feelings which are aroused when the “real” thing is met or referred to.[25] Symbols can be 
something as simple as a shape, animal, clothing or alphabetical. The important part of this 
concept is that they ignite a particular meaning for a particular person.  
Some activities can become symbols for action. For example, in Mexico, the athletic event of 
wrestling represents a broader meaning of suffering, defeat and justice.[26] The clothing, masks, 
shaved hair and struggle between “good and evil” play out on the wrestling mat. Rebecca Klatch, 
a social movement scholar, describes two categories of symbols: the meaning and the master. 
The meaning is the positive role that symbols play in society and the master is the use of symbols 
in manipulation.[27] Klatch asserts that symbols’ effectiveness is not inherent in their existence, 
per se, but is important because of the action they inspire and act as glue to bind the group 
together.  
Symbols are primarily meaningful for those who are part of the in-group (those members who 
align behind symbols and are recognized and accepted among membership). Meaning, in itself 
can only be ascribed by those who recognize the cultural validity and internal resonance of the 
symbol. It is an “internal experience, not open to external observation.”[28] This is where the 
counter-terrorist who stands outside of the in-group and who desires to affect the happenings of 
the in-group has the most difficulty. It would follow that symbols are the prerogative of the in-
group and are more of use as an interpretive tool rather than a kinetic method to incite change of 
a target group. 
Contesting Frames and Countering Narratives  
Mayer N. Zald, a well-known scholar on social movements, asserts that framing can be a 
strategic activity.[29] Frames are continually opposed and contested by competing groups and 
governments. Competing frames are used to counter messages and frames imposed by 
opposition groups. Slogans, symbols and messages are manipulated, twisted and projected onto 
an audience in hopes that they will do more than just bounce off. Frames are used to get in 
between the cracks of a culture and seep into the minds of potential followers. Within framing 
competitions, groups battle to gain the loyalty and commitment of a particular group. One by-
product of the framing process is the intention to vindicate the righteousness of a cause.[30] 
Groups do not only have to contest with governments or other, external organizations, but can 
also compete within their own faction. For example, during the split of the GIA and GSPC, the 
GSPC opposed the killing of civilians and in order to entice GIA’s loyalists, they enhanced the 
religious obligations of not killing innocent people. Some level of competition had to occur 
between the two groups in order to segregate followers into those who supported the GIA and 
those that supported the GSPC. Different movements have different goals. There are often 
numerous actors pursuing different strategies simultaneously. The terror organization which can 
communicate its goals in such as way as to inspire action will be more visible and gain more 
credibility which it can translate into framing capital. The use of “collective action frames” 
describes people as “potential agents of their own history,” and gives them the opportunity to 
make a difference.[31]  
Just as opposing groups use contesting frames in order to usurp the influence of the other, the 
use of counter narratives also provides a possible arrow in the counter-terrorist’s quiver. In order 
to use counter narratives a grasp on cultural norms, stories, myths and folktales are required. To 
counter the salafi narrative, one must become fluent in the writings and tales of those who are 
considered experts and mentors in the field.[32] Writers such as: Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, 
Ibn Tamiya, and Sayyid Mawdudi have influenced salafi groups and helped to shape ideologies 
that guide terror groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Jama’at Islami and al-Qaeda. It is 
important to be aware of the messages and narratives that are coming into the terror group in 
order to develop an effective counter-strategy.  
According to Eric Hoffer in his book The True Believer, mass movements inspire a readiness to 
die in their adherents and an opportunity for united action while simultaneously demanding blind 
faith and single-hearted allegiance.[33] Mass movements are encouraged by a desire for change. 
Enthusiasm is generated through societal forces such as religion, revolutionary or nationalist 
movements. Hoffer sees a fallacy in the effectiveness of propaganda on a mass movement. On 
its own, propaganda cannot force itself on the unwilling recipient, cannot create something 
fundamentally new and maintaining committed believers.[34] To create counter-narratives and 
counter-framing strategies, one must be intimately familiar with the culture and symbols of a 
particular target group as well as fluent in the movement structure and motivational buttressing 
created by movement leaders. The counter-terror agent must become adept at manipulating and 
transmitting messages which resonate among a population. 
Advertising and Marketing Strategy 
The goal in both advertising and recruiting is to collectively motivate a target to buy or participate 
in the supply and demand process. Advertising and recruiting revolve around the delivery of a 
message or promotion of an idea, good or service. Edward L. Brink and William T. Kelley define 
promotion as, “the coordination of all seller-initiated efforts to set up channels of information and 
persuasion to facilitate the sale of a good or service, or the acceptance of an idea.”[35] A 
marketing plan is created and implemented in order to mold demand in an advantageous manner 
to the firm or agency within the economic context and anticipated actions and reactions of 
competitors (or anti-terrorism agents).[36] The primary challenge to both the marketer and the 
terror recruiter becomes how to reinforce behavior that facilitates buying a product or joining a 
group and steering the buyer or recruit away from competitors or government authority figures.  
The consumer (recruit) is faced with the options of buying (joining) decisions and must rely on 
brand names as a “shorthand expression of perceived values-values which often reflect the 
attitudes of the social group to which the buyer belongs or aspires.”[37] Applying this to the 
multitude of terror organizations which exist in the world today, the potential recruit is faced with 
joining possibilities to numerous organizations; they will most often choose to join the group which 
reflects the values of the social group to which they belong. This brings in the earlier personal 
network concept and reiterates the importance of gaining a foothold within the close-knit social 
network that shapes the value system of the recruit.  
The importance of advertising in a particular cultural setting impacts the buying behavior of a 
given population in society. Irving S. White, an advertising strategy scholar asserted that, 
“advertising is only one of the several sources of stimulation that a product contains for the 
individual in society. The influences of culture and of private sensations modify and intermingle 
with the stimuli of advertising to achieve the final pattern of relationship between the seller’s 
product (or ideas and services) and the consumer.”[38] Products and ideas posses their own 
cultural contexts and they vary between one culture and another. Ideas generated and processed 
within one culture may not sell well outside of that given culture. The cultural contexts provide a 
set of meanings and the consumer begins labeling products and ideas with good, bad or neutral 
expectations based on these meanings.[39] Terror recruiters sell the image of their organization 
just as an advertiser sells the reputation of his brand. The image of the brand lends predictability 
and stability to the consumer’s relationship with the product which allows him to experience the 
aspects of the product that he values.[40] Branding allows for a consumer or recruit to buy the 
perceived values or meanings of the brand (organization) as well as the obvious benefits of 
owning a product or being a member of a group. The choice to buy or join comes down to a 
customer’s or recruit’s decision not about notions people have about a brand or what a group is 
“really” like, but contributes to them determining whether or not the brand is the one, “for me.”[41] 
The Audience  
The type of audience has an effect on the way a product is promoted and influences choices 
made by recruiters or advertisers on approach methods. The immense number of potential 
buyers or joiners to a terror organization requires access to large-scale communication systems 
such as mass media. Communication is key to marketing. Lessons of communication in the 
advertising (and recruiting) process are important for anti-terrorist agencies to heed. The 
communication process consists of a source, a message and a receiver. The process begins 
when the source decides he wants to get an idea or message “across” into a form for transmittal. 
He must encode that message into symbols such as words, gestures or pictures that his 
audience will understand. This works the same for terror organizations.[42] The communication 
process includes both encoding and decoding. Encoding is primarily accomplished by the 
message giver and decoding by the message receiver. The outcome of the message delivery 
depends on the ability of the receiver to decode the message. The outcome is also termed 
feedback. The communication process is successful only if four steps are accomplished, “getting 
the attention of the receiver, employing symbols which the receiver can understand in a 
sufficiently unambiguous manner, arousing needs in the receiver, and suggesting a solution 
which is compatible with the situation in which the receiver finds himself.”[43]  
Communication can be conducted through various means as we discussed earlier. Face-to-face 
communication is more personal and can create a more reliable feedback process. 
“Communication is the essence of promotion and exists only to the extent that the sender and the 
receiver of the message are in tune with each other.”[44] The success of a message often hinges 
on its ability to reinforce predispositions of an audience, his attitudes, values and goals.[45] An 
audience does not consist of passive receptors, but adjust their attitudes and availability schedule 
based on information they want or don’t want.[46] One aspect of marketing to an audience 
consists of targeting or market segmentation. Market segmentation is the process by which a 
market is divided into groups of people who will react to marketing efforts in reasonably similar 
manners.[47] Segmentation is made based off demographics or predicted success or failure in a 
particular aspect of the market. Geographical speculation is not a successful segmentation 
strategy on its own, but combined with social class can narrow down target audiences.[48]  
Cultural groupings are important to advertisers and recruiters. Different societies have different 
cultural patterns. One particular challenge for the counter-terrorist from a different culture is 
balancing cultural similarity and cultural diversity, both powerful forces that lend stability and 
tension to a society. “The ‘in group’ fosters feelings of security in belonging, in knowing the ‘right’ 
things to do and how to do them. The ‘out group’ is threatening since it is hard to understand and 
might try to destroy ones’ own ways. Its meanings can be misinterpreted.”[49] The way an 
audience perceives itself will predict the resonance of a particular message. The “self definition” 
of the audience will allow the audience to screen messages and determine if they are suitable for 
them.[50] Market segments are active, seeking, screening, assessing and initiating.[51]  
Group membership will influence the receptivity of a message. An individual’s behavior is an 
intersection of sets of behavior found in subject groups. Members of the group share certain 
features, some formal, some informal. Understanding the similarities found within a group gives 
clues to the nature of the members and what they get out of participating in the group.[52] These 
clues are important to the advertiser or counter-terrorist in order to understand what motivates 
potential recruits to join a terror organization and what need or desire that it fulfills. Understanding 
the complex set of cognitive reasons for joining can allow the counter-terrorist to unravel the cues 
that allow him to influence or prevent the recruit from joining in the first place. Being cognizant of 
peer-to-peer relationships and associations are important as well.  
The Source 
Although consumers choose to buy products based on individual product performance, some 
buying choices are affected by the reputation of the marketer (source). The more credibility 
retained by a source, the more persuasion is facilitated.[53] The same idea holds true for levels of 
perceived government legitimacy and the impact of government-sponsored messages. A highly 
credible source can be a powerful force in changing opinion. Those sources thought of as highly 
credible are often perceived as “fair” and “justified” in their conclusions rather than low-credibility 
sources.[54] This conclusion can change, however, when over time, audiences begin to 
dissociate source and message content.[55]  
Counter-terrorist agents often want to know the best way to influence or alter the perceptions, 
opinions or actions of a target. Ideally, the absorption of the anti-terror message includes the 
adoption of opinions similar to the counter-terrorist. The adoption process contains five stages: 
awareness, interest, evaluation, trial and adoption.[56] The awareness stage is when the 
individual is aware of the new opinion but is not motivated to seek out any additional information 
about it. The interest stage is when the individual is sufficiently interested in the new idea and 
want to seek out further information about it. During the evaluation stage an individual decides 
whether or not to try the idea out. It is here he decides whether or not the product or idea is “for 
me.” The trial stage is where the individual tries the product or idea on a small scale in order to 
decide whether it meets his need and to determine whether or not they want to move to full 
adoption. Finally, the adoption stage is when the individual makes the decision to completely 
adopt the idea or use the product. Of the four sources of transmitting messages, the impersonal 
networks (using the mass media) are the most important in creating awareness but personal 
(face-to-face) sources are the most important during the evaluative stage.[57] 
The Message 
A message is defined as, “any sign or signal that can be interpreted in a meaningful way, or the 
summation of signs relating to the communication of one or more ideas; a printed ad, a television 
commercial, or a sales presentation.”[58] Recall that a message must be encoded before it can 
be sent. Senders encode, or frame, a message in a way that can be decoded or interpreted by an 
audience in a manner that will inspire action. Both the sender and receiver can only encode and 
decode in terms of the experience each has had.[59]  
Messages are framed strategically to impact a particular audience. The frame can be adjusted 
according to the make-up of the audience. Advertisers strategically market messages to particular 
audiences by making assumptions about their audience before they start. Terror recruiters make 
the same assumptions. To gauge an audience, advertisers or recruiters must understand four 
factors.[60] First, they must identify the specific groups to be addressed. Narrowing down a target 
audience helps to determine the trajectory of the message. This may not be an easy decision to 
make because the advertiser or recruiter naturally wants to get as many buyers or recruits as 
possible and subsequently wants to target the largest number of audience members as possible. 
Second, they must understand the characteristics of the audience which includes an evaluation of 
relevant needs and goals. Third, they should have a grasp on the present state of knowledge in 
the desired audience. For religious terror recruiters this means that using grand religious rhetoric 
may not resonate with a population that has not been immersed in a religious upbringing. If the 
audience does not understand the frame, it won’t resonate. Finally, advertisers and recruiters 
must recognize the audience’s position relative to the product. They must have a strategy to 
depict their group or product as something new, better and more improved than other alternatives. 
The message sender must be aware of how much knowledge their audience already has about 
their product or group.  
Messages must be specific enough to communicate a clear message. If they are too ambiguous, 
the receiver will interpret the message based on their own personal cultural wiring and could 
create expectations or stereotypes based on previous life experiences. This is why, for the 
counter-terror agent, it is very important to keep a message specific and focused; the more 
ambiguous a message, the more wiggle-room for the audience to misinterpret it.  
The credibility of the messenger is an intervening variable in the delivery of the message to the 
audience. Consumers like to feel the salesman is someone like themselves.[61] If the advertiser 
or recruiter is too different, they will have a difficult time projecting a message to a customer or 
recruit. Clark Leavitt, an advertising theorist listed three critical responses to advertising; first, the 
initial discovery of a message (stopping power), the continuing perusal of the message (holding 
power) and finally the comprehension of the message (sending power).[62] These three 
responses are applicable to terror recruiters’ framing strategies. They must get the recruit to pay 
attention to the message (which can come in the form of a shock and awe video, narrative, 
speech or the recruit may come to the message on his own as a response to a traumatic personal 
experience), they must also hold the recruit’s attention or commitment long enough to use them 
operationally in order to facilitate the maturation of the group, and finally, they must get the recruit 
to internalize the message to a level in which they themselves can become recruiters and 
perpetuate the cycle. Another commonly used model in advertising and marketing is AIDA, 
Attention, Interest, Desire, and Action.[63] 
Fear, Intimidation, and the Use of Negative Campaigning  
Fear, coercion and intimidation are common methods used to ignite action in a terror organization. 
The recruitment process is often the seduction process whereby a potential recruit is enticed into 
the organization before he is induced to step beyond previously demarcated psychological 
boundaries. Some recruiters may be able to talk a recruit into committing a violent act using non-
coercive means, but there may be instances where threats, intimidation and force are also used 
to initiate an operation. The problem with using fear in an advertising campaign (and possibly an 
anti-terror campaign) is that there is no guarantee that it will be effective. Carl Hovland, Irving 
Janis and Harold Kelley hypothesized that when communication does not relieve the fear it 
arouses, the audience will ignore or minimize the threat.[64] If an advertising campaign presents 
a problem and then a solution (the company’s product), it must overcome fear it aroused in its 
audience.  
Using fear in an advertising or anti-terror campaign may raise the question of even including a 
solution in the message. The message that stresses need arousal is apt to be more effective than 
that of just offering solutions because an audience must be motivated before it pays attention to 
the message or take time to understand its concepts.[65] Propaganda on its own is not effective 
in keeping a target committed to a cause. In order to maintain and perpetuate a movement, 
recruiters and group members must be reinspired or forced to believe. What initially took just 
strategically framed words takes even more kinetic methods to keep members active in the group. 
Those recruits that are being converted by force need to have a fervent conviction that the idea 
they are being forced to accept is the only true one.[66]  
Coercion and force can create fanaticism which can spark violence.[67] The reverse is also true. 
A new recruit, just like a new convert to a religion is usually more fanatical then those born into 
the religion. The challenge to terror recruiters is not in keeping new recruits motivated, it is in 
keeping veteran group members committed to the cause. For example, in the GSPC, terror 
recruiters can be enticed out of the organization by amnesty programs or jailed which places the 
members in the position of reorganizing priorities and deciding if membership is still “worth it.” 
The information minister of the GSPC recently turned himself into Algerian authorities leaving the 
organization with a “brain drain,” and without a major public affairs or recruiting representative.[68] 
These veteran members have been loyal to their product, but may hit a tipping point where they 
no longer get personal satisfaction out of membership and want to defect. These defectors can 
be important weapons in the counter-narrative campaign. There will be some amount of blowback 
for becoming a “traitor” to the rest of the members committed to the organization, however, they 
may reach a few doubters in the organization and provide valuable intelligence about the 
organization to counter-terror agents. 
Methods of Promotion 
There are four major types of promotion methods available: media (television, radio, magazines, 
newspapers, billboards and direct mail), face-to-face (salesmen), publicity (news releases), and 
word-of-mouth which occur via personal or social channels.[69] The terror recruiter has the same 
options available to him. Audiences will gravitate towards those communications which favor their 
predispositions. Multiple channels of promotion are available when an audience is disposed to 
listen to a particular subject. “Since audience attention is self-selective, exposure to 
communications in different media tends to be supplementary, not complementary; that is, those 
who read about a topic also tend to listen, and those who pay attention at one time also tend to 
pay attention at another.”[70] Therefore, it would behoove the terror group to pick multiple 
methods of promotion to get their message out and to reach potential recruits. This can work just 
as effectively for the counter-terror agent.  
Levels of education can influence the source of media promotion that an audience favors; for 
example, the higher the level of education, the greater the reliance on print and the lower the 
education the greater reliance on television and radio.[71] Studies have also shown that 
interpersonal communication and personal appeal is the most effective channel of promotion.[72] 
For counter-terror agents, this means more use of human intelligence and source networks. 
Getting ideas, information and disinformation to targets will be most effective through personal 
networks rather than mass media. This does not necessarily mean that mass media is out of the 
question. Interpersonal communication can impact the effectiveness of mass media.[73] Paul F. 
Lazarsfeld and Herbert Menzel in their work, “Mass Media and Personal Influence,” documented 
the relationship between mass media and interpersonal communication,  
“People are somewhat more likely than the mass media to reach people who are as yet 
undecided. Personal influence about an issue is often exerted unexpectedly as a sideline or 
marginal topic in a casual conversation. It therefore is more likely to “get through” to the 
undecided or the opposed; mass media messages, by contrast, are more often approached with 
an awareness of their purposefulness. Face-to-face contact is also more flexible and provides 
immediate response to raise issues and arguments of immediate personal relevance to the 
listener. And finally, when someone yields to personal influence in making a decision the reward 
in terms of approval is immediate and personal.”[74]  
Therefore, targets of mass media should be educated and influential community leaders who can 
transmit the message through informal interaction with those audience members who want to 
raise questions and want reassurance from someone who is respected and valued within their 
personal circle. This is a valuable lesson for counter-terror agents. Instead of targeting the 
individual recruit with mass media persuasion, it may be more effective to target the educated 
elite with certain political and social messages that will trickle down to the masses.  
Repetitiveness of a message is valuable to advertisers and recruiters alike. The strength of the 
stimulus message effects the resonation and “staying power” of a message. One study cited the 
use of an intensive bombardment of a particular ad over the period of a year. The results showed 
that a message was most effective when it was shown in thirteen weekly exposures rather than a 
four-week exposure interval where the objective was to maximize the number of people who 
temporarily remembered the message.[75] Messaging is most effective when it is spaced at even 
intervals over a broader length of time rather than in short bursts over shorter time periods. 
Part II: Islamic Activism in Algeria and Maghrebian Diaspora 
An examination of the socio-political environment in Algeria is important to understand the 
conditions and framing strategies that were present when GSPC split from the GIA. Islamism 
developed in the 19th and 20th centuries across North Africa, Central Asia and countries in the 
Middle East. Some scholars assert Islamism was a response to colonialism by the west. As a 
result of al-Qaeda’s popularity, it is often debated whether or not Islamism, specifically the 
Wahabbi or Salafist-type has created a transnational Islamist movement. Although not every 
Islamist group is Salafi and groups in Algeria have ranged from apolitical social reformers to 
violent ideologues and extremists.[76]  
The armed resistance of the FIS was led by Madani Maezraq who framed the resistance to the 
repressive government as, “fighting for the sake of regaining the rights of the oppressed 
[mustadh’afeen].”[77] He pointed out that the violence used was only a response in kind to the 
failure of political efforts made earlier on behalf of the FIS.  
In 1992, an armed insurgency began in Algeria, led by the Groupe Islamique Arme (GIA). The 
movement began as a disorganized band of militants, but over time, grew into organized factions. 
The GIA used antisystem frames that justified its jihad as a fight against apostates, infidels and 
tyrants.[78] They rejected the political process and fought against democracy. The group also 
used religious and systemic framing, labeling the conflict as an “apostate” Islam versus the “true” 
Islam. According to this extremist interpretation and framing strategy, the frame of apostate or 
infidel created the image of an opposition who was not right in the mind of God, therefore, their 
removal from the earth would be sanctioned by holy law.  
The GIA’s use of violence began to create blowback against the organization. The Algerian public 
reacted harshly against the indiscriminate attacks against all whom the Islamists labeled as 
unfaithful. Some passive supporters began to fall away and the movement weakened significantly. 
The GIA became so restrictive people were barely able to breathe for fear the organization would 
say they were performing a function opposite of what their extremist interpretation called for. 
Internal leadership began to point the fingers of judgment at each other and soon the organization 
began to fall apart. The important lesson to take away from the GIA and their framing processes 
is that although the frames resonated among a portion of the population, the religious framing 
contest became so tiresome and restrictive; the people lost their willingness to support the 
organization. Life became limited on an individual basis which became too much for most of the 
population. This is an example of a group imploding from a failure to grow the organization and 
self-sabotage. However, the GIA does lend important clues for understanding what the GSPC’s 
framing strategies are and how the group may suffer the same fate as the GIA, primarily because 
of its “hereditary” framing strategies. 
The Danger of the Diaspora 
The North African Diaspora represents a social structure and a, “place of tensions, of continuous 
re-adjustments, a space of fragmentations and of unifying processes, symbolically as well as on 
the level of social practices.”[79] Members of the Diaspora reshape their relations in both time 
and space.[80] Over time and through social interaction, the immigrant population creates an 
alternate social identity separate from that which exists in the “home space.” This perceived 
separateness can facilitate the creation and evolution of a new collective memory rooted in a 
dislocated space and anchored in an awareness of being located somewhere away from the 
home space. Chantal Saint-Blancat a social science scholar has argued that the Algerians and 
their descendents in France constitute a Diaspora.[81] She contends that the Algerian Diaspora 
exists primarily through the construction of a Muslim Diaspora consciousness developed from 
personal and common socio-cultural experiences.  
One important factor to consider when examining the Algerian Diaspora is its relation to other 
ethnic enclaves within the larger European Diaspora. Each sub-group of displaced Muslims has 
their own spectrum of belief along the religious scale, conflicting with traditional and cultural 
norms that dictate different behaviors than perhaps practiced by a separate ethnic enclave. There 
is difficulty, therefore, in labeling all European Muslims as one collective group. There is a desire 
to be visible within the public space of European society which leads to a “desire to negotiate the 
status of Muslims collectively, removed from the current silent modalities of individual integration, 
which is often completed successfully but at the price of secularization.”[82]  
Framing within the Diaspora becomes a strategy of linking religious, social and personal 
narratives generated by the collective memories created over time. Religious leaders serving their 
followers must meet spiritual needs and create a welcoming and inclusive environment for those 
that already feel displaced. This creates a “target-rich environment” for GSPC or al-Qaeda 
recruiters. Preying on the struggling and frustrated youth, they provide an opportunity to take part 
in something important and bigger than themselves. Their messaging becomes based on shared 
narratives linked to the Diaspora’s collective memories. Recruiters can also be approached by 
disaffected youth looking for an alternative to lagging job opportunities and a way out of the 
Diaspora.  
Recruitment in a Diaspora is not uncommon according to Marc Sageman, author of 
Understanding Terror Networks. Of the 165 mujahideen he researched, 115 (70 percent) joined 
the resistance in a country where they had not grown up. Most were expatriots, workers, and 
refugees living away from their families. 14 percent were second generation in France, Britain in 
the United States where Sageman opines, “they might have felt a strong pull for the country of 
their parents and not been completely embedded in their host society. In France, they were part 
of an “excluded” generation.”[83] He goes on to assert that in an expatriate community or hostile 
non-western Muslim country, lonely people will look for companionship with Muslims of a similar 
background. In France, Maghreb Arabs would go to the mosque to make friends to “gain a sense 
of spiritual calling, and promote their values.”[84] Unemployment in the Diaspora contributed to 
the anger of the mujahideen. Maghreb Arabs were students or unemployed, many were involved 
in petty crime or living on welfare (70 percent).[85] Employment not only provides the 
fundamentals of living within a society, but also a sense of contributing and integration into social 
networks within the environment. Unemployment lends credence to the relative depravation 
theory and more so among the Maghrebian Diaspora. Combine feelings of frustration and 
alienation with the lack of income and terror recruiters have a pool of disgruntled recruits ready to 
make a change to choose from. Sageman also asserts that the Maghreb Arabs in his study of 
mujahideen, either first or second-generation in France, grew up feeling excluded from French 
society and were not religious as young people. Discrimination and underemployment contributed 
to their psychological readiness to join an organization that lent pride, cohesion and camaraderie 
to their lives.  
Counter-narratives and anti-messaging strategies can be applied in this environment, but 
perceived government legitimacy would be low (except among second and third generation 
immigrants who feel a sense of ownership to European countries and claim the government as 
their own). Our model accounted for levels of perceived governmental legitimacy and the effect of 
counter-narratives on a population’s decisions to join a terror group.  
The next section introduces our agent based model. We wanted to explore the effects of a 
message or counter-messaging campaign on a population of agents who held either high or low 
levels of perceived legitimacy of the government. We understand that counter-narrative 
campaigns cannot on their own defeat the terror recruiter, but it is a powerful peripheral tool that 
can enhance the counter-terror agent’s fight against the power of persuasion. 
Part IV: The Model 
Modeling the effect on recruitment into GSPC based on the framing, strategy, and delivery of a 
message simplification becomes necessary. Additionally, the information we have on GSPC’s 
recruitment efforts and strategies is very limited. In order to gain insight into GSPC’s recruitment 
we will be using an adaptation of Joshua Epstein’s agent based model of “Generalized Rebellion 
Against Central Authority.”[86] In order to create our model we utilized NetLogo v3.1 an agent-
based modeling software program.[87] When writing our program we utilized the code from the 
‘Rebellion’ model included with NetLogo v3.1 as an example and guide in our programming 
efforts. The ‘Rebellion’ model is also based on Joshua Epstein’s work in this same area of 
research.[88]  
Our Model 
This model contains four different actors: agents, preachers, cops, and spies. Each of these 
actors has a vision term that defines a neighborhood where each of these actors can see from 
their current location. In our model vision is set to two. This defines the neighborhood to 
determine where each actor can move in successive rounds when the model is running. It is also 
used to define the area for counting other actors in calculations for estimated arrest probability for 
agents and preachers and for determining the cumulative effect of preacher and spy messages. 
This term is also used by cops to determine area where they can arrest an active agent or 
preacher.  
When setting up the model we have to define some additional quantities. The first of these is 
government legitimacy (GL act) in a scale of 0-1 in increments of 0.01 and describes the actual 
legitimacy the population views its government. We determine this value using an empirical 
formula as defined below:  
GL act = (GDP 2005 / GDP 1996) * (1 – U 2005) * (1 – DF 2005)  
Where (GDP) is the per capita GDP normalized to 1996, the 1996 level was chosen because 
GSPC was founded in that year (U) is the unemployment rate for the specified year, and (DF) is a 
democracy factor for the specified country using an average of the Freedom House civil liberties 
and political rights measures for the specified year. The next quantities are the effect of the 
preachers message (P m) and the effect of the spy message (S m) in a scale of 0-1 in increments 
of 0.01.  
The main actor in the model are ‘agents’ who represent the general population that can either 
become a member of GSPC or remain a citizen satisfied with their current situation to prevent 
them from joining GSPC or any other terrorist organization. Each agent is assigned a random 
variable between 0-1 in increments of 0.01 for risk aversion (R a) and perceived hardship (H a). 
When the model is started each agent calculates their perceived government legitimacy (GL per) 
GL per = GL act + [N active-preachers-in-neighborhood * (P m) + N spies-in-neighborhood * (S 
m)] 
The result is then modified to ensure it remains in the 0-1 range by use of logic statements. For 
example, if the result is less than zero it is assigned a value of zero and a value of one if it is 
greater than one. Next, each agent calculates their estimated arrest probability (EAP) 
EAP = 1 - exp [-k * (N cops /(1 + N active-agents-in-neighborhood + N active-agents-in-
neighborhood))] 
Letting the term (N cops / (1 + N active-agents-in-neighborhood + N active-agents-in-
neighborhood)) = F in the above equation we can understand this function better. The greater the 
number of active agents and preachers in an agents vision the lower ‘F’ will be and hence the 
greater the probability they will also become a GSPC member.[89] Once (EAP) is calculated that 
quantity is used to calculate their net risk (NR a) 
NR a = R a * EAP 
Now we have to calculate the grievance for each agent (G a) given their current location in the 
world and surroundings  
G a = H a * (1 – GL per) 
Finally, since we have calculated G a and NR a we can now determine if an agent will become a 
member of GSPC or remain a non-GSPC member.  
G a – NR a > T 
The agent will become a member of GSPC is this value exceeds a certain threshold (T) which we 
chose to be 0.1.  
Preachers are our next breed in our model and are similar to agents. Similar to agents they are 
assigned random variables between 0-1 in increments of 0.01 for risk aversion (R p) and 
perceived hardship (H p). Each preacher calculates an estimated arrest probability (EAP) and net 
risk (NR p) using the same equations as agents. We then calculate the grievance for each 
preacher (G p) with (GL per = 0) and find that G p = H p. Again like agents we calculate if a 
preacher will spread the GSPC message or not with the following equation  
H p – NR p > T  
The preacher will then become one who spreads the GSPC message to recruit new members if 
the value exceeds the threshold (T) chosen to be 0.1. Preachers are also counted by agents 
when agents looking in their neighborhood and are multiplied by the value their effect of passing 
the pro-GSPC message.  
The next actor in the model are ‘cops’ who represent the state police force.  
Cops enforce laws and are restricted to arresting only one active agent who is a GSPC member 
or a preacher who is passing the GSPC message during each round in the model in their vision 
defined by their neighborhood. When a cop arrests an actor the agent or preachers is 
automatically reset so they are either no longer a GSPC member or passing a GSPC message. 
Additionally, they are assigned a random jail term with a maximum of 30 rounds.  
Spies are the simplest actor in our model. Spies do not have any direct interaction with other 
actors in the model. Their primary function is to be counted by agents when agents looking in 
their neighborhood and are multiplied by the value their effect of passing the anti-GSPC message.  
Model Assumptions 
• There are no consequences to agents if they leave GSPC and return to the non-
GSPC group.  
• The effect of the messaging, its framing, and method of delivery for the GSPC 
cause are all contained in the preacher and spy effect terms.  
• Max possible jail term has no effect on deterring agents or preacher behavior.  
• The effect of an agent or preacher within their vision is negated when the jail term 
is greater than zero.  
• For preachers we use GL per = 0 so that the preachers have a high probability of 
spreading the GSPC’s message to gain new members.  
• Preachers and spies don’t necessarily represent actual people, but represent the 
message they are passing whether for or against GSPC.  
• The model was only run through 100 time periods since a relative equilibrium 
was reached in the model after about 30 time periods. Data used for analysis was 
taken from time 30-100.    
Modeling Behavior in Algeria 
When modeling the ability to recruit new members we setup our model using the following 
settings for our baseline run to describe the current number of GSPC members in Algeria.  
• Agent Density = 75%  
• Preacher Density = 20%  
• Cop Density = 20%  
• Spy Density = 40%  
• GL act = 0.22[90]  
• Preacher Message Effect = 0.50  
• Spy Message Effect = 0.50  
In order to determine the effect of messaging on the membership in GSPC we varied the Spy 
Message Effect while holding all other variables constant. Our first case for Algeria we call the 
‘Good Message - Algeria.’ Here we assume that we put out a message with an appropriate frame 
that resonates with the agents so they will be less likely to join GSPC. In order to accomplish this 
in the model we set:  
• Spy Message Effect = 0.75  
Our second case for Algeria we call the ‘Bad Message - Algeria.’ In this case we assume that we 
put out a message with an inappropriate frame that has an anti-resonance effect on agents that 
reduces the effectiveness of other messages or makes agents more likely to join GSPC. In order 
to accomplish this we set:  
• Spy Message Effect = -0.20  





Algeria – Bad 
Message  
   
Result  Std. Dev.  Result  Std. Dev.  Result  Std. Dev.  
GSPC 
Member  41  0.972  27  0.521  72  3.020  
Non-GSPC 
Member  789  3.013  945  2.470  467  3.793  
When running the model we ran each setup 100 times and determined the average number of 
GSPC members for each time period (see Figure 1) then when a relative equilibrium was reached 
(time periods 30-100) we determined our steady state GSPC membership and Non-GSPC 
members. In each run of the model there were 1261 agents. The amount of agents not accounted 
for as GSPC members or Non-GSPC members are those jailed for recent GSPC activity.   
Modeling Behavior in France (Diaspora) 
When modeling the ability to recruit new members we setup our model using the following 
settings for our baseline run to describe the current number of GSPC members in France.  
• Agent Density = 75%  
• Preacher Density = 5%  
• Cop Density = 5%  
• Spy Density = 15%  
• GL act = 0.63[91]  
• Preacher Message Effect = 0.70  
• Spy Message Effect = 0.20  
In order to determine the effect of messaging on the membership in GSPC we varied the Spy 
Message Effect while holding all other variables constant. Our first case for the Diaspora in 
France we call the ‘Good Message - France.’ Again we assume that we put out a message with 
an appropriate frame that resonates with the agents so they will be less likely to join GSPC. In 
order to accomplish this in the model we set:  
• Spy Message Effect = 0.75  
Our second case for the Diaspora in France we call the ‘Bad Message - France.’ In this case we 
assume that we put out a message with an inappropriate frame that has a repelling effect on 
agents which reduces the effectiveness of other messages or makes agents more likely to join 
GSPC. In order to accomplish this we set:  
• Spy Message Effect = -0.20  
Diaspora Baseline 
Run  
Diaspora – Good 
Message  
Diaspora – Bad 
Message  
   
Result  Std. Dev.  Result  Std. Dev.  Result  Std. Dev.  
GSPC 
Member  200  1.887  182  1.620  292  3.099  
Non-GSPC 
Member  500  15.413  768  2.063  276  1.591  
When running the model we ran each setup 100 times and determined the average number of 
GSPC members for each time period (see Figure 2) then when a relative equilibrium was reached 
(time periods 30-100) we determined our steady state GSPC membership and Non-GSPC 
members. In each run of the model there were 1261 agents. The amount of agents not accounted 
for as GSPC members or Non-GSPC members are those jailed for recent GSPC activity.  
Model Run Summary 
After examining the data on GSPC membership we find that the framing of the message and how 
it resonates with the population matters from the perspective of affecting the perceived legitimacy 
of the respective governments and alter GSPC membership. In both the cases of Algeria and the 
Diaspora in France we find that the better we are at developing a message that resonates with 
our target population in the desired direction the lower the number of people who will be active 
members of GSPC.  
Conclusion  
After conducting the agent based model runs, we concluded that message construction and 
resonation effect do impact the recruiting successes and failures of GSPC. More importantly, we 
summarized that if counter-terror agents are going to construct a persuasive campaign with goals 
of reducing terror recruiting efforts, the message should be positive (good) and must resonate 
with the audience. Resonation factors include geographic and ethnic targeting, cultural resonance 
evaluations, and well-constructed behavior-oriented messages. Advertising strategies provide 
lessons in gaining attention and persuading audiences to consider risks, and benefits to joining a 
terror organization. Our agent-based model showed that in comparison to a baseline model, 
successful framing strategies combined with effective law enforcement methods will have a 
declining effect on GSPC recruiting efforts. Algeria is currently conducting an aggressive anti-
terrorist program and has been successful inducing GSPC members to turn themselves in and 
provide valuable intelligence to police. If our agent-based model is correct and Algeria continues 
these law enforcement efforts but combines them with an aggressive good-messaging campaign, 
GSPC recruiting should go down. Effective framing strategies (as part of a wider and more 
inclusive advertising strategy constructed to “sell” the state in a manner conducive to the 
resonation impact on the audience) are not a silver bullet. Counter-terror agents must combine 
these messaging strategies with effective and aggressive law enforcement efforts. In section one 
of our paper, we discussed the impact of counter-narratives on recruiting efforts. Our results show 
that as long as the counter-narratives provide a positive (good) message to an audience, who 
holds relatively high legitimacy for the government, they can be an effective terror-fighting tactic. 
One surprising aspect of our model was that the outcome for the Diaspora did not differ 
significantly from the results for the Algeria model. We held some element of doubt that an 
immigrant population which felt alienated, discriminated against and who withdrew into identity 
enclaves would respond positively to a good message from the government. The effect of a well-
framed (good) message on the Diaspora population in France was similar to the population in 
Algeria; recruiting success for GSPC was reduced.  
There were some problems we encountered during the model experience. First, initial 
measurements were more heuristic than empirical. The numbers representing perceived 
government legitimacy for both Algeria and the French Diaspora were based on outside research 
and a figure was chosen to represent perceived legitimacy. It is difficult to measure perceptions 
and there was no data available to confirm our assumptions of perceived legitimacy. Measuring 
attitudes is very difficult. Attitudes are unstable and fluid, they can change simply during the 
process of thinking.[92] Counter-terror agents cannot expect to change or create new attitudes, 
that is a process which is conducted internally and is inaccessible (at least in the long term) by 
outside forces. Agents should focus more on changing behavior by using scientific methods and 
persuasion theory.  
We recommend that if a persuasion campaign is going to be utilized, local (to the country being 
targeted) advertisers and behavioral scientists should be incorporated into the operation. Cultural 
intelligence is an invaluable part of a persuasion campaign and must be a priority for the counter-
terror agent. The local advertiser or scientist should be made into a stakeholder by contracting 
their efforts or providing an incentive for their cooperation so they place just as much emphasis 
on a positive outcome as the counter-terror agent.  
Persuasion campaigns are just one part of a comprehensive policy strategy that can target terror 
recruiting among Maghrebian Arabs whether they are in Algeria or France. Counter-messaging is 
not a fool-proof strategy and must be complimented by other law enforcement and intelligence 
efforts. Individual grievances, government legitimacy and credentialed cultural messaging 
campaigns are all areas that must be considered when planning future policies to combat 
recruitment by terror organizations. The GSPC may be on the decline, but aggressive efforts to 
counter recruiting strategies must continue as part of an overall anti-terror policy. The United 
States can share persuasion strategies with the Algerian and French governments in order to 
address the GSPC as a multi-lateral effort. Policy development should be a coalition effort 
between all nations. There are several advantages to this strategy. First, cultural experts, police 
and intelligence collectors are indigenous to the country and the United States will not have to 
grapple for area experts including culturally fluent message architects. Second, the United States 
is not burdened with kinetic enforcement responsibility and can assume a supporting and 
advising role. There are numerous Information Operations and Psychological Operations 
specialists who can advise their equivalents in both Algeria and France on lessons learned from 
campaigns conducted in the past to streamline efforts and enhance message delivery. Third, by 
using indigenous cultural messaging experts, the United States does not have to conceal 
involvement or influence with the operation, but can monitor the outcome of the campaign from 
within the controlled information circle.  
The GSPC represents a threat to French and Algerian interests. Their alliance with al-Qaeda 
makes them an indirect, yet important organization for U.S. counter-terror agents to be aware of. 
The demands of Iraq and Afghanistan have committed numerous counterintelligence and military 
assets, which is why multinational efforts are so important to combat terror groups in the Sahel 
and European Diaspora. 
Future Research Recommendations 
Our project could not encompass all aspects of the battle GSPC recruiters. We emphasize that 
anti-messaging tactics are only one part of the entire counter-terror process and should be 
applied in tandem with other efforts. We would recommend collecting empirical data through 
personal surveys using a structured and scientifically sound system to measure actual legitimacy 
among both Algerian and French Maghrebian Diaspora Arabs. Using these numbers, the model 
can be re-run and results should be compared to the results we came up with in our project. 
Different aspects of the recruitment process should be researched, for example, partitioning the 
project by demographics (age, gender, and religious center preference) would provide more 
focused and applicable data for the counter-terror agent. We believe through this project, we’ve 
provided a useful start for addressing the GSPC and their recruitment strategies through strategic 
messaging efforts and multinational alliances. 
Table 1: GSPC Membership in Algeria—Message Variations  
 
Table 2: GSPC Membership in France—Message Variations  
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